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income—like any other income—depends on economic
growth. Conclusion: utility-seeking capitalists have every
reason to love booms and hate crises. 
But, then, are capitalists really motivated by utility?
Is it realistic to believe that large American corporations
are guided by the hedonic pleasure of their owners—or do
we need a different starting point altogether? 
So try this: in our day and age, the key goal of leading
capitalists and corporations is not absolute utility but
relative power. Their real purpose is not to maximise
hedonic pleasure but to “beat the average”. Their ultimate
aim is not to consume more goods and services (although
that happens too) but to increase their power over others.
And the key measure of this power is their distributive
share of income and assets. 
Note that capitalists have no choice in this matter.
“Beating the average” is not a subjective preference but a
rigid rule, dictated and enforced by the conﬂictual nature 
CAN IT BE TRUE THAT CAPITALISTS PREFER
crisis to growth? On the face of it, the idea sounds silly.
According to Economics 101, everyone loves growth, es-
pecially capitalists. Proﬁt and growth go hand in hand.
When capitalists proﬁt, real investment rises and the
economy thrives, and when the economy booms the prof-
its of capitalists soar. Growth is the very lifeline of capital-
ists. 
Or is it? 
W H A T  M O T I V A T E S  C A P I T A L I S T S ?
The answer depends on what motivates capitalists. Con-
ventional economic theories tell us that capitalists are
hedonic creatures. Like all other economic “agents”
—from busy managers and hectic workers to active crim-
inals and idle welfare recipients—their ultimate goal is
maximum utility. In order for them to achieve this goal,
they need to maximise their proﬁt and interest; and this
Proﬁt from crisis
A HOMELESS MAN in Manhattan, New York, a ﬁle picture. Unemployment in the U.S. has been rising since the 2008 crisis.
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of the system. Capitalism pits capitalists against other
groups in society—as well as against each other. And in
this multifaceted struggle for greater power, the yard-
stick is always relative. Capitalists—and the corporations
they operate through—are compelled and conditioned to
accumulate differentially; to augment not their personal
utility but their relative earnings. Whether they are pri-
vate owners like Warren Buffet or institutional investors
like Bill Gross, they all seek not to perform but to outper-
form—and outperformance means redistribution. Cap-
italists who beat the average redistribute income and
assets in their favour; this redistribution raises their
share of the total; and a larger share of the total means
greater power stacked against others. In the ﬁnal analy-
sis, capitalists accumulate not hedonic pleasure but dif-
ferential power. 
Now, if you look at capitalists through the lens of
relative power, the notion that they should love growth
and yearn for recovery is no longer self-evident. In fact,
the very opposite seems to be the case. For any group to
increase its relative power in society, that group must be
able to strategically sabotage others in that society. This
rule derives from the very logic of power relations. It
means that capitalists, seeking to augment their income
share—read power—have to threaten or undermine the
rest of society. And one of the key weapons they use in this
power struggle—sometimes consciously, though usually
by default—is unemployment. 
J O B L E S S N E S S  A F F E C T S  R E D I S T R I B U T I O N
Unemployment affects distribution mainly through the
impact it has on relative prices and wages. If higher
unemployment causes the ratio of price to unit wage cost
to decline, capitalists will fall behind in the redistrib-
utional struggle, and this retreat is sure to make them
eager for recovery. But if the opposite turns out to be the
case—that is, if higher unemployment helps raise the
price/wage cost ratio—capitalists would have good rea-
son to love crises and indulge in stagnation. 
In principle, both scenarios are possible. But as Fig-
ure 1 shows, in America the second prevails: unemploy-
ment redistributes income systematically in favour of
capitalists. The chart contrasts the share of pre-tax proﬁt
and net interest in domestic income on the one hand with
the rate of unemployment on the other (both series are
smoothed as ﬁve-year moving averages). Note that the
unemployment rate is lagged three years, meaning that
every observation shows the situation prevailing three
years earlier. 
This chart does not sit well with received wisdom.
Mainstream economics tells us that the two series should
be inversely correlated; that the capitalist income share
should rise in the boom when unemployment falls and
decline in the bust when unemployment rises. But that is
not the case in the United States. In this country, the
correlation is positive, not negative. The share of capital-
ists moves countercyclically: it rises in downturns and
falls in booms—exactly the opposite of what economic
convention would have us believe. The maths is straight-
forward: for every 1 per cent rise in unemployment,
capitalists can expect their income share three years later
to jump by 0.8 per cent. Needless to say, this equation is
very bad news for most Americans—precisely because it
is such good news for the country’s capitalists. 
Remarkably, the positive correlation shown in Figure
1 holds not only over the short-term business cycle but
also in the long term. During the booming 1940s, when
unemployment was very low, capitalists appropriated a
relatively small share of domestic income. But as the
boom ﬁzzled, growth decelerated and stagnation started
to creep in, the share of capital began to trend upward. 
FIGURE 2
FIGURE 1
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There is a distributional struggle for power, and this
struggle is not a mere “sociological” issue. It is the centre
of our political economy, and we need a new theoretical
framework to understand it. 
Second, macroeconomic policy, whether old or new,
cannot offset the aggregate consequences of this distri-
butional struggle. Not by a long shot. Until the late 1970s,
the budget deﬁcit was small, yet America boomed. And
why? Because progressive taxation, transfer payments
and social programmes made the distribution of income
less unequal. By the early 1980s, this relationship in-
verted. Although the budget deﬁcit ballooned and in-
terest rates fell, economic growth decelerated. New
methods of upward redistribution have caused the share
of the Top 1 per cent to zoom, making stagnation the new
norm. 
Third, and ﬁnally, Washington can no longer hide
behind the bush. On the one hand, the concentration of
America’s income and assets, having been boosted by
large post-crisis bailouts and massive quantitative eas-
ing, is now at record levels. On the other hand, long-term
unemployment remains at post-War highs while job
growth is at a standstill. Eventually, this situation will be
reversed. The only question is whether it will be reversed
through a new policy trajectory or through the calamity
of systemic crisis. 
Jonathan Nitzan teaches political economy at York University
in Canada. Shimshon Bichler teaches political economy at
colleges and universities in Israel. All of their publications are
available for free on The Bichler & Nitzan Archives 
(http://bnarchives.net).
For their full paper on the subject, see Shimshon Bichler and
Jonathan Nitzan, “Can Capitalists Afford Recovery? Economic
Policy When Capital is Power”, Working Papers on Capital as
Power, No. 2013/01, October 2013, pages 1-36.
(http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/377/)
PEOPLE RECEIVING a monthly food handout
distributed from the Imperial Valley Food Bank, in
March 2009, in El Centro, California, where the
unemployment rate is very high.
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The peak power of capital, measured by its overall in-
come share, was recorded in the early 1990s, when unem-
ployment was at post-War highs. The neoliberal
globalisation that followed brought lower unemploy-
ment and a smaller capital share, but not for long. In the
late 2000s, the trend reversed again, with unemploy-
ment soaring and the distributive share of capital rising
in tandem. Looking forward, capitalists have reason to
remain crisis-happy: with the rate of unemployment
again approaching post-War highs, their income share
has more room to rise in the years ahead. 
The power of capitalists can also be examined from
the viewpoint of the infamous Top 1 per cent. Most
commentators stress the “social” and “political” problems
created by the disproportional wealth of this group, but
this emphasis puts the world on its head. Redistribution
is not an unfortunate side effect of growth and stagnation
but the main force driving them. 
Figure 2 shows the century-long relationship be-
tween the income share of the Top 1 per cent and the
annual growth rate of U.S. employment (with both series
smoothed as 10-year moving averages). And as the chart
makes clear, the distributional gains of this group have
been boosted not by growth, but by stagnation. The
overall relationship is clearly negative. When stagnation
sets in and employment growth decelerates, the income
share of the Top 1 per cent actually rises—and vice versa
during a long-term boom. 
Historically, this negative relationship can be divided
into three distinct periods, indicated by the dashed, freely
drawn line going through the employment growth series.
The ﬁrst period, from the turn of the 20th century until
the 1930s, is the so-called Gilded Age. Income inequality
is rising and employment growth is plummeting. 
The second period, from the Great Depression until
the early 1980s, is marked by the Keynesian welfare-
warfare state. Higher taxation and public spending make
distribution more equal, while employment growth ac-
celerates. Note the massive acceleration of employment
growth during the Second World War and its subsequent
deceleration brought by post-War demobilisation. Obvi-
ously, these dramatic movements were unrelated to in-
come inequality, but they did not alter the series’ overall
upward trend. 
The third period, from the early 1980s to the present,
is marked by neoliberalism. In this period, monetarism
assumes commanding heights, inequality soars and em-
ployment growth plummets. The current rate of employ-
ment growth hovers around zero while the Top 1 per cent
appropriates 20 per cent of all income—similar to the
numbers recorded during the Great Depression. 
So what do these facts mean for America? 
First, they make the fault lines obvious. The old slo-
gan “what’s good for GM is good for America” now rings
hollow. Capitalists seek not utility through consumption
but more power through redistribution. And they achieve
their goal not by raising investment and fuelling growth
but by allowing unemployment to rise and jobs to be-
come scarce. Clearly, we are not “all in the same boat”.
